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In re Marriage of Olhausen:
The Characterization of State Disability
Retirement Benefits After Dissolution

On May 14, 1975, the California Court of Appeal, Second District,
Division 4, rendered its decision in the case of In re Marriage of
Olhausen.1 This decision is the first in California to characterize
State disability retirement benefts as the separate property of the
disabled spouse, after dissolution of the marriage. The scope of this
note is to evaluate the significance of this case in light of previous
decisions and to prognosticate its future impact on California
community property law.
On October 2, 1972, the trial court entered its judgment dissolving the eight-year marriage of Alan and Jan Olhausen. During the
course of their marriage, Alan had been employed in police work
for the Cities of La Habra and Vernon from 1967 to 1970, and 1970
to 1972 respectively. Alan sustained a fractured spine during
his Vernon employment, which prevented him from performing
further services as a police officer. As a result of this injury, he
was retired with disability benefit payments of $444.58 per month
beginning April 10, 1972.2 The source of these retirement benefits
was a fund comprised of amounts deducted from each of Alan's
as a police officer 3
paychecks during the course of his employment
4
and contributions from his employer.
In its judgment dissolving their marriage, the trial court concluded that the disability benefits accruing after dissolution were
not community property and therefore not subject to division
1. 48 Cal. App. 3d 190, 121 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1975).
2. Id. at 192, 121 Cal. Rptr. 444 n.1 (1975). The Los Angeles manager
of the Public Employees Retirement System testified that Alan's benefits
were payable solely because of his disability. Since Alan's total service
was less than five years, he had not worked long enough to have any vested
rights in other benefits.
3. This deduction was mandated by CAL. GovT. CODE § 20600 et seq.
(West 1970).
4. This contribution was mandated by CAL. GovT. CODE § 20750 et seq.
(West 1970).

between the parties. It was the trial court's characterization of
disability retirement benefits as the separate property of the disabled spouse after dissolution from which Jan prosecuted her
appeal.
There is a plethora of case law in California dealing with the
division of "retirement" benefits upon dissolution of the marriage.
The great majority of these cases involve retirement benefits based
upon longevity or length of service. These cases have consistently
held that such benefits are, to the extent they have vested 5 during
the marriage, community property subject to equal division between the spouses in the event the marriage is dissolved. 6 The
rationale underlying the community treatment of these benefits
"... is the concept that they do not derive from the beneficience
of the employer, but are properly part of the consideration earned
by the employee."17 Thus in cases dealing with longevity retirement pay, whether the employee is required to make contributions
to the retirement fund has been held inapposite to the ultimate
characterization of the benefits as community property. 8 Furthermore, the principle that longevity retirement benefits are community property has been held to apply whether the source of
the retirement fund lies in a state, federal, military, or private
employment relationship. 9
Recently, in the cases of In re Marriage of Jones' ° and In re
Marriage of Loehr," the California Supreme Court refused to
apply the rationale underlying the community characterization of
"longevity" retirement benefits to "military disability" retirement
benefits. Instead it stated that:
5. The right to retirement benefits 'vests' when an employee acquires
an irrevocable interest in a fund created by his own contribution and/or
the contributions of his employer. The 'vesting' of retirement benefits must
be distinguished from the 'maturing' of those benefits, which occurs only
after the conditions precedent to the payment of the benefits have taken
place or are within the control of the employee. In re Marriage of Fifthian,
10 Cal. 3d 592, 596, 517 P.2d 449, 451, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, 371, n.2 (1974).
6. Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972);
Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 61 (1970); Benson v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 355, 384 P.2d
649, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1963); French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d
235, 134 A.L.R. 366 (1941); Crossan v. Crossan, 35 Cal. App. 2d 39, 94 P.2d
609 (1939).
7. In re Marriage of Fifthian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 596, 517 P.2d 449, 451,
111 Cal. Rptr. 369, 371 (1974).
8. Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765,
89 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1970); Sweesy v. L.A. etc. Retirement Board, 17 Cal. 2d
356, 110 P.2d 37 (1941).
9. Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972);
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Since disability pay serves primarily to compensate the disabled
servicemen for current suffering and loss of earning capacity, we
conclude that only such payments as are received during the marriage constitute a community asset. The veteran's right to 12
payment
subsequent to dissolution is his separate and personal right.

The Court in Jones and Loehr analogize "military disability"
retirement pay with compensation for personal injury, rather than
with "longevity" retirement pay. By making this analogy, the
Court was able to apply the laws relating to the division of personal
injury damages upon dissolution of the marriage. 1 These laws
permitted the court to characterize "military disability" retirement
pay as the separate property of the disabled spouse after dis-

solution.
Although compensation actually recovered for personal injury
during the marriage is community property under California
5
law,14 the Supreme Court held in Washington v. Washington
Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 61 (1970); Estate of Perryman, 113 Cal. App. 2d 1, 283 P.2d 298 (1955);
French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235, 134 A.L.R. 366 (1941); In
re Marriage of Fifthian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369
(1974); In re Marriage of Karlin, 24 Cal. App. 3d 25, 101 Cal. Rptr. 240
(1972); Bensing v. Bensing, 25 Cal. App. 3d 889, 102 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1972);
In re Marriage of Brown, 27 Cal. App. 3d 188, 103 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1972);
but cf. Goldberg, Is Armed Services Retired Pay Really Community Property?, 48 Calif. St. B.J. 12 (1973).
10. 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975).
11. 13 Cal. 3d 465, 531 P.2d 425, 119 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1975).
12. In re Marriage of Jones, 13 Cal. 3d 457, 464, 531 P.2d 420, 425, 119

Cal. Rptr. 108, 113 (1975).
13. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 5119, 5126 (West Supp. 1975).
14. Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal. 2d 315, 320-321, 202 P.2d 73, 76-77, 6
A.L.R. 2d 461, 466 (1949). In Zaragosa, the court held that a wife's cause
of action for personal injuries arising during the marriage is community
property, and consequently barred by the contributory negligence of her
husband. To overcome the injustice arising from the imputation of contributory negligence between husband and wife, the Legislature in 1957 enacted Civil Code § 163.5, which provided that all personal injury damages
were the separate property of the injured spouse. This rule, in turn, proved
unsatisfactory (see 8 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1966) pp. 427-433),
and in 1968 the Legislature amended § 163.5 to restore the community
property status of personal injury damages recovered during the marriage
and enacted § 169.3 to provide that damages received after dissolution are
the separate property of the injured spouse. This time the Legislature met
the problem of imputed negligence head on, enacting Civil Code § 164.6 to
bar imputation of contributory negligence between husband and wife.
§§ 163.5, 164.4 and 169.3 were reenacted as Civil Code §§ 5109, 5112,

that a cause of action for personal injuries which had not been
reduced to a judgment at the date of divorce became the separate
property of the injured spouse. In response to the decision in Wash-

ington, the California Legislature enacted California Civil Code
Section 5126,16 which extended the Washington holding to cover
cases in which the claim for personal injury had been reduced to a
judgment prior to dissolution, but payments were received after the
interlocutory decree of dissolution. With regard to personal injury
damages the law in California has evolved to the following rule:
Personal injury damages received during the marriage are community property, but amounts received after dissolution are the
separate property of the injured spouse. 17
Following the Jones and Loehr decisions, the Court in In re
Marriage of O1hausen analogized "state disability" retirement benefits with personal injury damages, thereby invoking the aforementioned rules pertaining to personal injury damages upon dissolution.
The analogy drawn in Jones, Loehr and Olhausen between
disability retirement benefits and personal injury damages is well
founded when one considers the equities involved in such cases.
The equitable considerations were well framed by Justice Traynor
in Washington v. Washington,8 wherein he stated that although
a rule classifying personal injury damages as community property

and 5126 respectively, in the 1969 Family Law Act.

[CAL. Civ. CODE §§4000
et seq. (West Supp. 1975)].
15. 47 Cal. 2d 249, 302 P.2d 569 (1956).
16. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5126 (West Supp. 1975):
(a) All money or other property received by a married person in
satisfaction of a judgment for damages for personal injuries or pursuant to an agreement for the settlement or compromise of a claim
for such damages is the separate property of the injured person if
such money or other property is received as follows:
(1) After the rendition of a decree of legal separation or a final
judgment of dissolution of a marriage.
(2) While either spouse, if he or she is the injured person, is living
separate from the other spouse.
(3) After the rendition of an interlocutory decree of dissolution of
a marriage.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), if the spouse of the injured
person has paid expenses by reason of his spouse's personal injuries
from his separate property or from the community property subject
to his management and control, he is entitled to reimbursement of
his separate property or the community property subject to his
management and control for such expenses from the separate property received by his spouse under subdivision (a).
17. In re Marriage of Pinto, 28 Cal. App. 3d 86, 89, 104 Cal. Rptr. 371,
373 (1972); Walzer, Cal. Marital Termination Settlements, (CONT. ED. B.
1971), p. 61; Attorney's Guide to Family Law Practice, (CONT. ED. B. 2d
ed. 1972), pp. 247-248.
18. 47 Cal. 2d 249, 302 P.2d 569 (1956).
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may be justified when it appears that the marriage will continue,
it loses its force when the marriage is dissolved after the cause of
action accrues. In such a case not only may the personal elements
of damages such as past pain and suffering be reasonably treated as
belonging to the injured party, but the damages for future pain and
suffering, future expenses, and future loss of earnings are clearly
attributable to him as a single person following the divorce. Moreover, as in any other case involving future earnings or other after
acquired property, the wife's right, if any, to future support may be
protected by an award of alimony. 19

The Jones and Loehr decisions limited themselves to the characterization of "military disability" retirement benefits as the
separate property of the disabled spouse after dissolution of the
marriage. Olhausen has extended that characterization to include
"state disability" retirement benefits, basing the extension on the
rationale propounded by the Jones and Loehr decisions.
There is, however, a distinction between "military disability" and
"state disability" retirement benefits which merits discussion. The
former is entirely a non-contributory fund, whereas the latter is
not. The Court in Olhausen addresses this distinction by saying:
We are of the opinion that the distinction is without substance, and
that the reasoning of the military retirement cases is applicable to
disability retirement under the state system as well.
....
The reasoning of the Jones and Loehr cases, holding that
disability allowances are not community property, is not based
upon the absence of a community interest in the retirement system.
The distinction is in the purpose of the payment. 20

The law in California is well settled that, where the "premiums"
on the husband's insurance policy are paid with community property funds, the chose in action represented by the policy is
community property. 21 The Supreme Court in Jones and Loehr
19. Id. at 253-254, 302 P.2d at 571.
20. 48 Cal. App. 3d 190, 193, 121 Cal. Rptr. 444, 445 (1975).
21. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Italy, 60 Cal. App. 602, 605, 214
P. 61, 62 (1923); Bazzell v. Endriss, 41 Cal. App. 2d 463, 465, 107 P.2d 49,
50 (1940); Mundt v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 35 Cal. App. 2d 416,
421, 95 P.2d 966, 968 (1939); Blethen v. Pac. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 198 Cal.
91, 99, 243 P. 431, 434 (1926); Estate of Wedemeyer, 109 Cal. App. 2d 67,
71, 240 P.2d 8, 11 (1952); Estate of Mendenhall, 182 Cal. App. 2d 441, 444,
6 Cal. Rptr. 45, 47 (1960); Tyre v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 54 Cal. 2d 399,
402, 353 P.2d 725, 727, 6 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (1960). Polk v. Polk, 228 Cal.
App. 2d 763, 781, 39 Cal. Rptr. 824, 835 (1964).

decisions did not have to wrestle with the body of case law involving the payment of insurance premiums with community property
funds, because in those cases the servicemen never made any
"premium" payments. However, in Olhausen, Alan was required
to make payments to the fund from which his disability benefits
emanated. Surely, these payments can be likened to "premium"
payments under a private insurance plan. Whereas in Jones and
Loehr there was no need to discuss the case law dealing with the
community characterization of insurance proceeds where the premiums have been paid with community funds, in Olhausen discussion
was logically unavoidable. The failure of the Court to discuss or
distinguish the case law dealing with insurance is the inherent
weakness of the Olhausen decision. However, the weakness is not
fatal, because the outcome of the Olhausen decision is just and
equitable for all parties concerned. Had the Court merely discussed
the insurance case law and concluded that the equities involved
in the case outweighed the community interest created by the payment of premiums with community funds, the decision would have
been beyond reproach.
There are several potential ramifications of In re Marriage of
Olhausen. By classifying state disability retirement benefits as the
separate property of the disabled spouse after dissolution of the
marriage, the Court has opened the door to argument as to the
classifications of other types of disability payments. For instance,
in the area of Workmen's Compensation benefits, the cases of
Northwestern Redwood Co. v. Industrial Acc. CoM. 22 and Estate

of Simoni 23 have firmly established that Workmen's Compensation
payments received during the marriage are community property,
but there has never been a case deciding the character of Workmen's Compensation benefits after dissolution. After Olhausen, it
would appear that Workmen's Compensation benefits should be the
separate property of the disabled spouse following dissolution
of the marriage. The same is true of benefits stemming from
private disability insurance programs.
Founded as it is on considerations of justice and equity, the
Olhausen decision is unlikely to be reversed and should become the
law of California. Therefore, it would behoove attorneys handling
dissolution cases to take special note of the Olhausen decision. The
attorney representing the disabled spouse who fails to argue, upon
22. 184 Cal. 484, 194 P. 31 (1920).

23. 220 Cal. App. 2d 339, 33 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1963).
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dissolution of the marriage, that Workmen's Compensation payments or private insurance disability payments are the separate
property of his client may, in light of Olhausen, face a malpractice
2
suit such as that arising in the case of Smith v. Lewis.

4

JoHN K. HoovER

24. 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975). Smith v.
Lewis was an action against an attorney for malpractice in failing to assert
his client's community interest in her husband's federal and state retirement
benefits in marriage dissolution proceedings. The defendant attorney represented the wife in the proceedings and his failure to claim any interest
on behalf of his client to husband's retirement benefits, in light of recent
decisions in the field, resulted in a judgment and verdict for the wife
against the attorney in the amount of $100,000.

